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Water Marketing in California Revisited:
The Legacy of the 1987-92 Drought

Kevin M. O'Brien*
Robert R. Gunning**

I. INTRODUCTION

When the Pacific Law Journal last published a symposium on water
law,' water marketing in California was in its nascency.' While much had
been written 3 over the years touting the benefits of water transfers and
water marketing,4 as of 1988 there had been few concrete examples of
successful water transfers.5 Despite repeated efforts by the California
*
Partner, Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Sacramento, California. A.B. University of California,
Davis (1977); J.D. University of Denver (1980).
Associate, Downey, Brand, Seymour & Rohwer, Sacramento, California. A.B. College of William
**
& Mary (1990); J.D. Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California (1993). The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the authors.
1.
Symposium: Revisiting CaliforniaWater Law, 19 PAC. LJ. 957-1434 (1988).
2.
See generally Kevin M. O'Brien, Water Marketing in California, 19 PAC. LJ. 1165 (1988)
(discussing the state of water marketing as of 1988).
3.
For previous discussions of water transfers, see Gary D. Weatherford, Legal Aspects of Interregional
Water Diversion, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1299 (1968); CHARLES J. MEYERS & RICHARD A. POSNER, MARKET
TRANSFERS OF WATER RIGHTS: TOWARDs AN IMPROVED MARKET IN WATER RESOURCES (National Water
Commission Legal Study No. 4, 1971); CLIFFORD T. LEE, GOVERNoR'S COMMISSION To REvTEw CALIFORNIA
WATER RIGHTS LAW, THE TRANSFER OF WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (Staff Paper No. 5, 1977).
The terms "water marketing" and "water transfers" are used interchangeably in this article to mean
4.
the transfer, temporary or permanent, of water rights (including both real property and contractual interests) from
one purpose or place of use to another, without loss of priority. From a technical standpoint, however, "water
marketing" generally connotes the buying and selling of water entitlements in a free market system, much like
other commodities. O'Brien, supra note 2, at 1166-67. In the authors' view, it is unlikely that a true commoditytype market for water entitlements will develop in California. Water transfers and the general use of economic
incentives, however, will play an increasingly prominent role in California water policy.
5.
At that time, the most widely discussed example of water marketing in California was the transaction
between the Imperial Irrigation District (1D) and the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD),
which involved the financing of improvements in iD's water system by MWD in return for a portion of the
water saved by the improvements. See Harrison Dunning, The Physical Solution in Western Water Law, 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 445, 479-83 (1986). In addition, the Yuba County Water Agency (YCWA) made transfers in
1987 and 1988 to the California Department of Water Resources in the amount of 83,100 and 135,000 acre-feet,
respectively. Testimony of Donn A. Wilson, Administrator of YCWA, before the State Water Resources Control
Board (Jan. 17, 1992) at fig. 5 (copy on file with the authors) [hereinafter YCWA Testimony]. Of course, water
transfers in California have early origins, the most notable being transfers from the Owens Valley by the City
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Legislature to remove perceived legal barriers to the transfer of water,6 it
was unclear whether water transfers would ever make a significant
contribution to water resource management in California.
Much has changed since 1988. From 1987 through 1992, California
endured six years of drought. A number of successful water transfers
occurred in the early part of the drought.7 The Drought Water Bank was
established in 1991,8 making the Department of Water Resources (DWR)
the principal arbiter of water transfers during the drought.9 In 1991, the
Water Bank effected transfers of 400,000 acre-feet of water involving 350
sellers and 20 buyers; another 265,000 acre-feet of water was held in
carry-over storage by the State Water Project for use in subsequent
years."0 In 1992, more than 150,000 acre-feet of water was transferred
under the auspices of the Water Bank.11 Water transfers, in short, played
a major role in helping California weather a water supply crisis.
Another seminal event in the development of water marketing in
California was the 1992 enactment of the federal Central Valley Project
Improvement Act (CVPIA). 12 The CVPIA established sweeping new
directives for the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) in relation to water
transfers of Central Valley Project (CVP) water.1 3 More fundamentally,
the CVPIA altered the Bureau's mission and purpose in operating the CVP
from one focused on meeting the needs of agricultural, municipal,
industrial and power contractors to one focused on achieving a "reasonable
balance" among competing demands
for use of CVP water, including the
14
wildlife.
and
fish
requirements of
While the question of whether water transfers will contribute
substantially to California's future water resource management policy has

6.
7.

See infra notes 31-66 and accompanying text (discussing recent legislation).
For example, the YCWA transferred water to DWR in 1987 (83,100 acre-feet), 1988 (135,000 acre-

feet), 1989 (110,000 acre-feet), and 1990 (109,000 acre-feet). YCWA Testimony, supra note 5, at fig. 5. YCWA
also transferred water to the city of Napa in 1989 (7,000 acre-feet) and 1990 (6,700 acre-feet), and to the East

Bay Municipal Utility District in 1989 (60,000 acre-feet). Id.
8.
The Drought Water Bank was established pursuant to Cal. Exec. Order No. W-3-91.
9.
Although the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) retained its statutory authority to
review and approve transfer petitions, in the authors' view the SWRCB showed considerable deference to DWR
in the review and approval of Water Bank transfers. See infra note 16.
10.

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PROGRAM ENViRONMENTAL IMPACT

REPORT FOR STATE DROUGHT WATER BANK iii (1993) [hereinafter WATER BANK EIR].
11.
Id
12.
Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3401-3412, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706
(1992) [hereinafter CVPIA] (codified in scattered sections of the United States Code, titles 16, 25, and 43).
13.
Id. § 3405, 106 StaL 4709-4714; see infra section IV(A)(1) (discussing transfer of CVP water).
14.
CVPIA § 3402(0, 106 Stat. 4600.
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now been answered in the affirmative, many questions remain concerning
how water transfers will (and should) occur. Most significant is the
question of whether DWR and the Bureau should play a central role in the
review and approval of water transfers. A central thesis of this Article,
however, is that the development of water marketing in California will be
greatly hindered if the Bureau and DWR continue to play a dominant role
in certain aspects the water transfer process. Historically, the principal role
of DWR and the Bureau has been to operate the state's two major water
projects. 15 In the authors' view, there is a strong institutional bias within
each agency to preserve and maximize the yield of the two projects for the
benefit of the agencies' major constituency groups, namely project
contractors and, increasingly, fish and wildlife advocates. When the Bureau
and DWR are thrust into the new role of determining how much water is
available for transfer by non-project water users,16 they become entangled
in a conflict of interest. Part IV(A) of this Article discusses this conflict,
asserting that it precipitated the promulgation of questionable policy in
relation to determining the amount of water available for transfer.17 Due
in part to the exigent circumstances of the drought, this issue thus far has
received little debate. But if, over the long term, prospective sellers
holding senior water rights are to continue to enter the market, they must
have assurances that the playing field is a level one and that the decisionmakers are not tainted by conflicts of interest.
The other key issue affecting the future of water transfers in California
involves the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta. Since most transfers will
involve the export of water from north to south through the Delta, and
since export pumping is currently restricted pursuant to the Endangered

15.
The Central Valley Project is operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation, while the State
Water Project (SWP) is operated by DWR. See HAROLD E. ROGERS & ALAN H. NICHOLS, WATER FOR
CAuro-RNI 20-115 (1967) (describing the two projects).
16.
Technically, authority to approve transfers involving water used pursuant to state-issued water rights
is vested in the SWRCB. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1700-1745.11 (West Supp. 1994). However, most
transfers in California will involve the use of conveyancing facilities owned and operated by the Bureau or
DWR. California law requires DWR and other public entities to make available for water transfers unused
capacity in conveyance facilities. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1810-1814 (West Supp. 1994). However, in practice,
DWR has insisted on playing a much more expansive role in the review of water transfer proposals, including
involvement in the initial determination of how much water is available for transfer. In a memorable statement
made in connection with the establishment of the Drought Water Bank, California Governor Pete Wilson
admonished prospective buyers and sellers to utilize the Water Bank for all transfers because "we've got them
by the aqueduct." Norman Hill, Introduction to Water Transfers,LAND USE FORUM, Fall 1992, 319, 322. This
not-so-subtle reminder that state and federal conveyance facilities are needed, in most instances, to effect water
transfers has seemingly become the unofficial motto of many state and federal water officials.
See infra notes 67-119 and accompanying text.
17.
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Species Act 8 (resulting in few available "windows" for the conveyance

of water to the south), 9 it is clear that until the Delta is fixed, widespread
water transfers will not occur. While a solution to the Delta's perplexing
ills is beyond the scope of this Article (and at times, seemingly beyond the

capacity of mankind), the development of water transfer policy in
California will continue to be linked inextricably to Delta conditions.2"
The purpose of this Article, then, is to trace the development of water
marketing in California over the past six years. After reviewing
California's water supply outlook2 ' and recently adopted state legislation
pertaining to water transfers,22 the bulk of the Article examines the major
unresolved issues that continue to hinder the development of water
marketing.'
II. THE CASE FOR WATER MARKETING: CALIFORNIA'S
WATER SUPPLY OUTLOOK

In the coming years, California water transfer policy will likely develop
against a backdrop of chronic water shortages. DWR estimates that, by the
year 2020, demand for water in California will exceed supply by 2.2-4.2
18.
The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) [hereinafter ESA].
19.
While the water quality and fishery problems associated with the Delta are myriad, export pumping
restrictions have been imposed as a result of two actions under ESA. On or about February 12, 1993, the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) issued an opinion resulting from its formal consultation with the
Bureau pursuant to § 7 of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536. The opinion, entitled "Biological Opinion for the Operation
of the Federal Central Valley Project and the California State Water Project," concluded that the long-term
operation of the two projects would be likely to jeopardize the continued existence of Sacramento River winterrun Chinook salmon. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
FEDERAL CENTRAL VALLEY PRoC'r AND TE CALFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT 51 (1993) (on file with the
Pacific Law Journal). It identified particular measures as a "reasonable and prudent alternative" which, if
implemented, according to NMFS would avoid jeopardy to the winter-run salmon as a result of long-term
operation of the projects. Id. The measures included numerical limits on the incidence of take at the Bureau's
pumps, which have the practical effect of limiting export pumping. Id.at 60. In addition, on May 26, 1993, the
United States Fish & Wildlife Service issued its Biological Opinion regarding the effects of the operation of
CVP on Delta Smelt. UNITED STATES DEPARTmENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, FOUMAL
CONSULTATION ON CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT OPERATIONS CRITERIA AND PLAN FOR 1993: EFFECTS ON DELTA
SMELT 2 (May 26, 1993) (on file with the Pacific Law Journal). This latter opinion imposes additional
restrictions on export operations for 1993. Id. at 2-31. As a result of the two opinions, extra export pumping
capacity has been available only in the late summer and early fall. Hill, supra note 16, at 321.
Presently the SWRCB is not approving long-term transfers that divert additional water from the Delta
20.
until an environmental evaluation of the cumulative impacts of transfers is prepared. Hill, supranote 16, at 321.
This evaluation which was being conducted by a consortium of parties under the auspices of a programmatic
environmental impact report, is currently in abeyance. Interview with Albert I. Herson, Vice President & General
Counsel, Jones & Stokes Associates, Inc. (Feb. 16, 1994) (notes on file with the authors).
See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
21.
See infra notes 31-66 and accompanying text
22.
See infra notes 67-217 and accompanying text
23.
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million acre-feet per year (MAF/yr). 24 In dry years, a shortfall of 5.8-7.8
MAF/yr is expected.'
These projected shortages will occur principally because of an
increased demand for water by urban and environmental interests.
California's population is expected to grow from its current 31 million
inhabitants to 49 million by the year 2020.26 In that period, urban demand
for water will increase by about 4.8 MAF/yr. 27 Likewise, demand for
environmental protection is expected to grow dramatically within the next
few years.
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has issued
proposed Bay-Delta standards which, if adopted, will decrease the supply
of water available for agricultural and urban use by 540,000 ar/yr in
normal years and 1.1 MAF/yr in dry years.28 The trend toward allocation
of water to fish and wildlife and other "instream" uses will further
diminish the amount of water that is available for consumptive use.
California's water supply is unlikely to increase significantly. No major
new water supply projects are anticipated, due to environmental and fiscal
considerations.29 Moreover, California's share of Colorado River water
may decrease substantially as Arizona and Nevada begin to divert their full
allotted appropriations. This could decrease the amount of water now
available to the Metropolitan Water District (MWD) by 400,000 acre-feet
or as much as 1 MAF/yr.30 Since much of California's urban growth is
occurring in the southern part of the state, water shortfalls in that region
could be particularly severe.

CALIFORNIA WATER COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, DRAFr CALIFORNIA WATER
24.
PLAN UPDATE 14 (Vol. I 1993) [hereinafter DRAFr WATER PLAN UPDATE]. The 2 MAF/yr range is attributed
to uncertainty over how much water will be required to meet the environmental demands of the Delta. Id.
L
25.
Id. at 146. California's population explosion has already begun. The state's population grew by 6
26.
million in the 1980's, and is presently growing by 600,000-700,000 persons per year. NORTHWEST ECONOMIC
ASSOCIATES, CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE SUPPORTS WATER TRANSFERS: THIRD PARTY IMPACTS IN PERSPECTIVE
3-4 (May 1993) [hereinafter NEA]. Most of the urban sprawl associated with burgeoning population is occurring
in the Central Valley and South Coast regions. DRAFt WATER PLAN UPDATE, supra note 24, at 146.
DRAFT WATER PLAN UPDATE, supranote 24, at 14, 170.
27.
Water Quality Standards for Surface Waters of the Sacramento River, San Joaquin River, and San
28.
Francisco Bay and Delta of the State of California, 59 Fed. Reg. 810 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 131).
Controversy exists as to the accuracy of the EPA's estimates of water supply impacts resulting from its proposed
water quality standards; some water users contend that the EPA seriously underestimates such impacts.
29.
DRAFr WATER PLAN UPDATE, supra note 24, at 367.
30.
Id at 12.
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II. RECENT STATE LEGISLATION AFFECING WATER TRANSFERS
Continuing a trend begun in the early 1980's, the California Legislature
has, since 1988,31 adopted numerous measures intended to promote water
marketing. Whereas the early legislation focused on removing physical and
institutional barriers to water marketing, the recent legislation principally
seeks to mitigate third-party impacts resulting from water transfers. This
Section briefly summarizes the legislation adopted between 1988-1993.
A. 1988 Legislation
Short and long term transfer provisions were consolidated in 1988 to
clarify the relationship between transfers and the rights of other legal water
users. The legislation did not radically alter the former statutory scheme.
The most significant change in the short term or "temporary" transfer
provisions 32 was to the definition of "consumptive use." Water Code
section 1725 now permits a permittee or licensee to transfer only the
amount of water that the permittee or licensee would have "consumptively
used" or stored in the absence of the transfer.33 "Consumptively used" is
defined by the statute as the "amount of water which has been consumed
through use by evapotranspiration, has percolated underground, or has been
otherwise removed from use in the downstream water supply as a result
of direct diversion." 4 As discussed in part IV(A) below,35 this statutory
definition has not resolved all issues relating to determination of the
quantity of water available for transfer.36
Long term transfers are still treated differently than temporary changes.
First, long term transfers, because of their potential environmental
consequences, are not exempt from the California Environmental Quality
Act (CEQA) as are temporary transfers.37 Second, the transfer approval
process is much different from that required for short term transfers. Prior
to approving a long term transfer petition, the State Water Resources

For a discussion of pre-1988 state legislation, see O'Brien, supra note 2, at 1190-95.
31.
Temporary changes are water transfers for a period of one year or less. CAL. WATER CODE § 1728
32.
(West Supp. 1994).

33.

Id., § 1725 (West Supp. 1994).

Id.
34.
See infra notes 67-119 and accompanying text.
35.
For example, the "consumptive use" definition may lead to the depletion of ground water supplies,
36.
since seepage water can be transferred based upon this definition. See Hill, supra note 16, at 322.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1729 (West Supp. 1994).
37.
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Control Board (SWRCB) must hold a hearing, at which time the
recommendations of the Department of Fish and Game (DFG) are to be
reviewed." A petition may then be approved if it does not result in
substantial injury to any legal user or unreasonably affect fish and
wildlife.39 This qualification of the no injury rule recognizes that long
term transfers, by their very nature, will have more substantial impacts
than temporary changes.
B. 1991 Legislation
Senate Bill 301, enacted in 1991, was designed to protect fish and
wildlife interests from injury resulting from water transfers. ° Any person
filing a petition to change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose
of use must, in addition to notifying the SWRCB, notify the DFG in
writing.4 ' The short and long term transfer provisions were amended to
clarify that any permittee or licensee proposing a transfer must so notify
the DFG.42 The DFG must supposedly ensure that the transfer will not
unreasonably affect fish & wildlife. 43 Additionally, any person entitled to
the use of water, whether based on appropriative, riparian, or other right,
may petition the State Board to transfer water for instream purposes."4
The Board may approve such a change so long as it does not increase the
amount of water that the person is entitled to and does not unreasonably
affect other legal users of the water.4 Significantly, the proposed use
need not involve a diversion of water.4 Water has never been transferred
for instream purposes pursuant to this provision, however.47

38.
Id. § 1736 (West Supp. 1994). The trial transfer provisions were eliminated from this section in 1988.
See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 1191 (discussing trial transfers for temporary transfers).
39.
CA. WAiER CODE § 1729 (West Supp. 1994).
40.
Id, §§ 1703, 1707, 1726, 1736 (West Supp. 1994) (codifying Senate Bill 301).
41.
Id. § 1703 (West Supp. 1994).
42.
Id. §§ 1726, 1736 (West Supp. 1994).
43.
See id. § 1725 (West Supp. 1994) (stating that transfers may not unreasonably affect fish and
wildlife).

44.
45.

Id. § 1707(a) (West Supp. 1994).
Id § 1707(b) (West Supp. 1994).

46.
Id.
47.
Telephone Interview with Steve Macaulay, Chief of Water Transfers Office, Department of Water
Resources (Feb. 4, 1994) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Macaulay Interview]. The one petition filed under
this provision was withdrawn because of numerous protests. The petitioner had wished to fallow land along
Butte Creek and to allow the water to flow into the San Francisco Bay. Serious questions were raised as to
whether there had been a history of irrigation on the land and whether any of the water ever would reach the
Bay because of numerous downstream diversions. Id
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The 1991 Legislature also enacted Assembly Bill 1605.48 The
legislation created a water leasing procedure which seeks to provide water
to water deficient areas, encourage conservation, and protect third parties
and areas of origin.49 A water rights holder may lease up to 25% of the
water the lessor would have applied or stored in absence of the lease
agreement for a period not to exceed five years.50 Such a lease constitutes
a reasonable, beneficial use and thereby protects the lessor's water
rights.51 The legislature apparently believed that these leases would
encourage conservation by giving water rights holders an incentive to
reduce their use of water.
The leasing provisions seek to protect third parties from adverse
consequences of water transfers. A lease may not injure another legal user
52
of water or unreasonably affect fish, wildlife, or other instream uses.
The SWRCB must be notified of all lease agreements, and shall in turn
notify all legal users as well as the DFG.53 Water leases may not impair
water quality in the Delta, 54 and, unlike short term transfers, must comply
with CEQA.5 s Additionally, water districts must give individual members
notice of any proposed lease and distribute proceeds from a lease in
accordance with Water Code section 1022.56 These provisions protect
other legal water users, water district members, and environmental interests
from adverse consequences of water leases. By doing so, however, these
protective measures, particularly the Delta restrictions, also diminish the
number of potential water leases. In fact, these water leasing provisions
have not yet been invoked.57

48.
CAL WATER CODE §§ 1020-30 (West Supp. 1994) (codifying Assembly Bill 1605).
49.
Id.
50.
Id. §§ 1020, 1021(a) (West Supp. 1994).
51.
Id. § 1024(c)(1) (West Supp. 1994).
52.
Id. § 1021(b) (West Supp. 1994).
53.
Id. §§ 1025, 1025.5, 1026 (West Supp. 1994). The lessor need not file a petition for a change in point
of diversion, place of use, or purpose. Id. § 1025.7 (West Supp. 1994).
54.
Id. § 1027(a) (West Supp. 1994).
55.
Id. § 1029 (West Supp. 1994). If the lessor is a water district, the lessor is the lead agency. If the

lessor is a private party and the lessee a water district, the lessee is the lead agency. If both parties are private
parties, the State Board is the lead agency. Ma

56.

Id. § 1022(b)(1), (3) (West Supp. 1994).

57.
Macaulay Interview, supra note 47. The greatest impediment has been the Delta dilemma, which has
obstructed all long term water transfers. Id. There has been a substantial amount of discussion about these water
leasing provisions. Id.
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C. 1992 Legislation
In 1992 the Legislature attempted to tackle the myriad of problems
associated with transfers involving water districts. Prior to 1992, for
instance, it was unclear whether a water district could transfer only
"surplus" water.5 8 While the 1992 legislation did not definitively resolve
all of these issues, it did clarify them somewhat.
The 1992 legislation states that a water supplier5 9 may transfer water
outside of the supplier's service area if the supplier has allocated the
6
amount of water available for the water year to its water users. 0
However, the water transferred need not be surplus water.61 The water
supplier may transfer water that has been made available through (1)
conservation or alternate water supply measures taken by individual water
users or by the water supplier; or (2) a contract with a water user to have
the water user reduce its allocation through dry farming, fallowing, or
other actions that will reduce water use.62 There is, however, a restriction
on the amount of water a supplier may obtain due to fallowing. 63 Thus,
so long as the needs of the water users are being met, a supplier may
transfer water outside of its service area even if this ultimately results in
the provision of less water than its service area is entitled to receive. This
option gives water suppliers flexibility as well as an incentive to conserve
64
water, thereby increasing the amount of water available for transfer.
The 1992 legislation also seeks to minimize the adverse effects that
transfers may have on ground water basins. A transferror may only
substitute groundwater for the transferred water if the groundwater use is
consistent with a groundwater management plan or if the water supplier
determines the transfer will not lead to overdraft conditions. 65 This
requirement, combined with Assembly Bill 3030 (Groundwater

58.
O'Brien, supra note 2, at 1193.
59.
"Water supplier" is defined as "a local public agency or private company supplying or storing water,
or a mutual water company." CAL. WATER CODE § 1745(b) (West Supp. 1994).
60.
Id. § 1745.04 (West Supp. 1994).
61.
Id. § 1745.06 (West Supp. 1994).
62.
Id. § 1745.05(a)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1994).
63.
If land fallowing agreements impact 20% of a district's water supply, public hearings and express
District approval are required. Id. § 1745.05(b) (West Supp. 1994).
64.
This flexibility also decreases the need for individual water users to have the ability to transfer their
water outside of the district. See infra section IV(D) (discussing user-initiated transfers).
65.
CAL. WArER CODE § 1745.10 (West Supp. 1994).

1061

Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 25
Management), has spurred the preparation of groundwater management
plans across the state.6
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES

A. Quantifying Transferable Water: The "Real Water" Issue
The issue of greatest controversy in relation to water transfers
continues to be how to determine the amount of water available for
transfer. This is hardly surprising given the huge economic stakes involved
in resolving this critical issue.
As noted above, a critical issue underlying the development of transfer
policy is the appropriate role of DWR and the Bureau. Nowhere is this
issue more central than in the determination of transferable water. On the
one hand, DWR and the Bureau have a legitimate interest in protecting the
integrity of the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project against
the effects of improper transfers. As DWR has observed,
Most of California's agricultural water use is in the Central Valley,
and this is where much future water transfer activity is likely to be
concentrated. Within the Sacramento and San Joaquin river basins,
all appraisals of water transfers must begin with the recognition
that the Federal Central Valley Project [(CVP)] and the State Water
Project [(SWP)] absorb most errors that are made in water
transfers. This exposure results from the conditions of water rights
permits under which the CVP and SWP withdraw water from the
Delta and its tributaries. Those conditions, ordered by the State
Water Resources Control Board, require the release of water from
CVP and SWP reservoirs as needed to maintain specified water
quality and flow criteria in the Delta. To the extent paper water
transfers reduce the flow of water available to meet Delta criteria,
the deficiencies must be made up by release of additional water
from Federal and State reservoirs. If subsequent runoff soon refills
the reservoirs, there may be no net harm. However, under
continued drought conditions, significant water supply impacts may
result. Thus, the Federal and State water contractors have an

66.
Macaulay Interview, supranote 47; see CAL. MVATER
CODE §§ 10750-10755.10 (West Supp. 1994)
(codifying Assembly Bill 3030). Section 10753 permits local agencies to implement groundwater management
plans. Id. § 10753 (West Supp. 1994).
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interest in ensuring that transfers of Sacramento-San Joaquin basin
water do not simply take water from the CVP and SWP without
compensation and sell it elsewhere. (Conditions are somewhat
different in other basins, but many of the principles described
herein are applicable.) 67
While there is general agreement that "errors" in water transfers should
be avoided so as to prevent improper impacts on the two projects, there is
considerable disagreement as to what constitutes an "error." In the authors'
view, DWR and the Bureau share a strong institutional bias to preserve
and maximize the yield of the two projects for the benefit of the agencies'
major constituencies, namely project contractors and, increasingly,
environmental interest groups. As discussed below, this bias has led to the
establishment of questionable policy on the quantification of transferable
water.
1. Legal Background
Interestingly, California was the first state to recognize the
appropriative water right as a transferable property interest. In a trilogy of
decisions between 1857 and 1867,6 the California Supreme Court
established the basic principle that an appropriator possesses a property
interest that extends to the right to change the point of diversion, place of
use, or purpose of use without loss of priority, so long as the change does
not cause "injurious consequences" to the rights of others. 69 The courts
of other western states generally accepted California's water transfer
principles.7 °
The principal limitation on the right of an appropriator to transfer water
is the "no injury" rule, now codified in sections 1702 and 1706 of the

67.
DEPARTMENr OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER TRANsFERs iN CAuPORmA: TRANSLATING CoNCEFI
INTO REALIrY 11-12 (Nov. 1993) [hereinafter WATER TRANSFERS].
68.
Davis v. Gale, 32 Cal. 26 (1867); Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 162 (1860); Maeris v. Bicknell, 7 Cal. 261
(1857).
69.
See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REv. 119, 123-25
(1990) (discussing early California cases).
70.
See, e.g., Biggs v. Utah Irrigating Ditch Co., 7 Ariz. 331, 64 P. 494 (1901); Davis v. Gale, 32 Cal.
26 (1867) (adopting California principles on water transfer); Fuller v. Swan River Placer Mining Co., 12 Colo.
12, 19 P. 836 (1888) (quoting with approval from Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161 (1860)); Trambley v. Luterman,
6 N.M. 15,27 P. 312 (1891); and Hague v. Nephi Irrigation Co., 16 Utah 421, 52 P. 765 (1898); Frank v. Hicks,
4 Wyo. 502, 35 P. 475 (1894).
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California Water Code.7 1 The no injury rule arose from the
interdependency of water uses and the definition of appropriative rights.
Under the appropriation doctrine, "each appropriator is given a protectable
property interest in the stream regime as it exists when he initiates his
appropriation. 72
The most frequent type of injury which can result from a change in the
purpose or place of use is an increase in consumptive use. The term
"consumptive use" is typically defined as loss of water to the stream
system or other aquatic regime from which the right being changed is
supplied.73
In determining whether a proposed transfer will increase consumptive
use - thus raising the potential for violation of the "no injury" rule - a
central issue is how to establish the baseline against which any increase in
consumptive use is measured. This issue has two elements, one relating to
the definition of the right itself and the other relating to the temporal point
of reference. With respect to the first component, it has long been the rule
in many western states that the historic practices of the irrigator, rather
than the irrigator's decreed or "paper" right, control in determining
limitations to a change inuse.74 At least one western state, New Mexico,
has rejected the historic use rule. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected
the historic use rule, holding that a prior adjudication decree, and not the
actual practices of the appropriation, controls as to the quantity of water
which can be diverted at the new place of use.75 This issue has not been
squarely addressed by California courts. It seems likely, however, that
71.
California Water Code § 1702 states: "Before permission to make such a change is granted the
petitioner shall establish, to the satisfaction of the board, and it shall find, that the change will not operate to
the injury of any legal user of water involved." CAL. WATER CODE § 1702 (West 1971). California Water Code
§ 1706 states: "The person entitled to the use of water by virtue of an appropriation other than under the Water
Commission Act or this code may change the point of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use if others are
not injured by such change, and may extend the ditch, flume, pipe, or aqueduct by which the diversion is made
to places beyond that where the first use was made." Id. § 1706 (West 1971).
72.
George A. Gould, Conversion of AgriculturalWater Rights to Industrial Use, 27 ROCKY MTN.MIN.
L. INsT. 1791, 1798-99 (1982). An appropriator is not protected from all changes in the stream regime. For
example, a farmer may change to a new crop although the new crop requires water at different times or
consumes more water than did the old crop. Harkey v. Smith, 247 P. 550, 553 (N.M. 1926).
73.
Gould, supranote 72, at 1823. This is an important point because DWR and the Bureau have defined
consumptive use not as any loss of water to the stream system from which the right being changed is supplied
but as a loss to any beneficial use (as, for example, where deep percolation occurs to saline sink or polluted
aquifer). The net result is to eliminate from the computation of consumptive use water that may be removed
from one useable water source to another useable water source and is hydrologically separate from the first
source. This is a significant change from established principles of western water law.
74.
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. § 41-3-104 (1977); Weibert v. Rothe Bros., Inc., 618 P.2d 1367 (Colo. 1980);
City of Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52 (Colo. 1968).
75.
W.S. Ranch Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 439 P.2d 714, 715 (N.M. 1968).

1064

1994 / Water Marketing In CaliforniaRevisited
California courts would look for guidance on this issue to newly enacted
Water Code section 1725, which, in the context of temporary transfers,
76
defines the transferable amount by reference to past consumptive use.
With respect to the temporal aspect of the baseline issue, Professor
George Gould has observed that:
The historic use rule raises several interesting questions. First, how
long a period is historic? For example, can an appropriator raising
alfalfa begin raising sugar beets, which require more water, and
thereby increase consumptive use? If so, how long must sugar beets
be raised in order to establish a historic use? Or if only part of the
acreage to which the right is attached has been actively irrigated in
recent years, may the appropriator extend his use to unirrigated
portions and increase consumption and diversion entitlements?
Once again, if he may do this, for how long a period must he
engage in this practice to establish historic use?77
The authors have found no California authority squarely addressing
these questions. However, general water law principles of California and
other western states suggest that historic use should be defined by
reference to maximum historic consumption, absent an adjudicatory
determination that the appropriative right has been lost, in whole or part,
by forfeiture or abandonment."
It is well-established under California law that an appropriative water
right is perfected by diligent application of water to beneficial use.7 9
Once perfected, the right becomes a protected property interest that may
not be taken without just compensation."0 While California law provides
that water held under a vested right "may" revert to the public if all or any
part of the water is not used for a period of five years, the reversion is not
automatic." The statute provides that, "[s]uch reversion shall occur upon
a finding by the board following notice to the permittee and a public

76.
CAL WATER CODE § 1725 (West Supp. 1994).
77.
Gould, supra note 72, at 1843.
78.
For a discussion of the laws of abandonment and forfeiture in California, see WELLS A. HUTCHINs,
THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 285-98 (1956). The statutory period for forfeiture in California is five
years. CAL. WATER CODE § 1241 (West Supp. 1994).
79.
E.g., Duckworth v. Watsonville Water & Light Co., 158 Cal. 206,210-11, 110 P. 927,929-30 (1910).
80.
E.g., United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 101, 227 Cal. Rptr.
161, 168 (1987).
81. CAL WATER CODE § 1241 (West Supp. 1994).
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hearing if requested by the permittee." 2 Moreover, the case law makes
clear that the party claiming forfeiture has the burden of proving the facts
that constitute the forfeiture. 3 While the authors have found no California
authority squarely addressing the issue of resumption of use following nonuse for a period of five years, other western states have sustained the
84
resumption of use where no third party has intervened.
Applying these principles, a cogent argument can be made that historic
use should be defined by reference to maximum historic consumption,
absent a determination, following notice and a hearing, that a forfeiture or
abandonment of the right has occurred. Arguably, any unilateral
determination by DWR, the Bureau, or the SWRCB to define historic use
by reference to some other, more limited, timeframe would result in the
unconstitutional infringement of vested property interests.
2. Bureau Policy Under CVPIA
All transfers involving Central Valley Project (CVP) water are now
governed by section 3405 of the CVPIA."5 Section 3405 provides that all
transfers of CVP water shall be subject to review and approval by the
Secretary of the Interior under the conditions specified in the statute.86
Transfers involving more than 20% of CVP water subject to long term
contract within any contracting district or agency is also subject to review
and approval by that district or agency under conditions specified in the
87
CVPIA.
The transfer provisions of the CVPIA provide minimal guidance
regarding how to quantify water available for transfer. Section
3405(a)(1)(A) provides that no transfer or combination of transfers shall
exceed, in any year, the average annual quantity of water under contract
actually delivered to the contracting district or agency "during the last
three years of normal water delivery prior to the date of enactment of this
title." 8 Section 3405(a)(1)(I) provides that the water subject to transfer

82.
83.
84.

Id.
Erickson v. Queen Valley Ranch Co., 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 582, 99 Cal. Rptr. 466, 448 (1971).
E.g., Application of Boyer, 248 P.2d 540, 544 (Idaho 1952).

85.

CVPIA § 3405.

86.
Id. § 3405(a)(1).
87.
Id. Among the conditions is the provision that the transfer "will have no unreasonable impact on the
water supply, operations, or financial conditions of the transferor's contacting district or agency or its water

users." Id § 3405(a)(1)(K).
88.
Id § 3405(a)(1)(A).
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three years of normal water delivery prior to the date of enactment of this
title.""8 Section 3405(a)(1)(I) provides that the water subject to transfer
"shall be limited to water that would have been consumptively used or
irretrievably lost to beneficial use during the year or years of the
transfer."89 The phrase "consumptively used or irretrievably lost to
beneficial use" is not defined in the Act.
The Bureau has adopted "Interim Guidelines" for implementation of
the water transfer provisions of the CVPIA. 9° The Interim Guidelines
attempt to clarify the standards by which water is deemed to have been
"consumptively used or irretrievably lost to beneficial use" within the
meaning of section 3405(a)(1)(1). 91 The Interim Guidelines state:
(1)
Crop consumptive use shall be the total evapotranspiration
of applied water minus effective precipitation and does not include
transportation losses, return flows, leaching, frost protection, or
deep percolation to useable ground-water basins.
(2)
Project water irretrievably lost to beneficial use shall mean
deep percolation to an unuseable ground-water aquifer (e.g., a
saline sink or a ground-water aquifer that is polluted to the degree
that water from that aquifer cannot be directly used.). 92
The Bureau's definition of "consumptive use" and "irretrievably lost"
are remarkable in their restrictiveness. For example, these definitions
purport to exclude from the definition of "consumptive use" all seepage
and transportation losses, including seepage to useable groundwater basins.
The Bureau's definitions are contrary to established principles of western
water law93 and to express provisions of California law, which defines

88.
i. § 3405(a)(1)(A).
89.
Id. § 3405(a)(1)(1). Transfers between project contractors within counties, watersheds, or other areas
of origin are deemed to meet the conditions in subsections (A) and (I). Id. § 3405(a)(1)(M).
90.
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF REmAMATION'S
INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF WATER TRANSFERS UNDER TITLE XXXIV OF PUBLIC LAW 102575 (Feb. 19, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter INTERIM GUIDELINES]. The Interim
Guidelines are to remain in effect until the final rules and regulations for transfers under CVPIA are
promulgated. Id. at 1.
91.
Id at4.
92.
Id.
93.
See, e.g., Farmers' Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272 P. 2d 629, 631 (Colo.
1954) (stating that the transfer of water to a different drainage increases consumptive use); Dry Creek No. 2
Ditch Co. v. Coal Bridge Co., 129 P.2d 292, 296 (Colo. 1942) (stating that consumptive use includes all
elements of loss to the stream).
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include seepage to groundwater. 94 Neither the language of CVPIA nor its
legislative history suggest that Congress intended such a restrictive
approach.
Even more remarkable than the Interim Guidelines themselves is the
interpretation given them by Bureau staff. The Bureau apparently intends
to use the "last three years of normal delivery prior to October 30, 1992"
as the temporal baseline for determining the amount of water
consumptively used or irretrievably lost to beneficial use during the year
of the transfer. 95 A plain reading of the statute, however, indicates that
the "last three years" language of section 3405(a)(1)(A) merely refers to
the maximum amount of water that may be transferred. There is no
indication that Congress intended the provision to be used as the temporal
baseline for determining historic consumptive use. The difference could be
critical to a water user that has decreased its consumptive use of water in
96
recent years as a result, for example, of fluctuations in irrigated acreage.
Under the Bureau's interpretation, the user could not transfer the amount
it historically consumed. This interpretation is contrary to principles of
western water law and penalizes water users for conserving water and
enhancing irrigation efficiency.
a. Do the Interim Guidelines Violate the Administrative
ProcedureAct?
A significant, and as yet unanswered, question is whether the Bureau's
Interim Guidelines violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 97 The
Bureau did not undertake a notice and rulemaking procedure prior to
implementing the Interim Guidelines. Under section 553 of the APA, any
regulation other than interpretative rules, general policy statements, or
internal organization rules must be accompanied by a rulemaking
procedure.9" Exceptions to this general provision are to be strictly
construed. 99

94. CAL WATER CODE § 1725 (West Supp. 1994). Technically, this definition applies only to temporary
transfers. In all likelihood, however, this definition would provide guidance to a court reviewing a long term
transfer as well.
95.
Telephone Interview with Gail Hefler-Scott, Bureau of Reclamation (Feb. 8, 1994) (notes on file with
the authors) [hereinafter Hefler-Scott Interview].
96.
Agricultural water use, of course, is related closely to agricultural commodity prices. Selecting the
three years of normal delivery preceding the enactment of CVPIA as the measuring rod is, at best, arbitrary.
97.
5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1988).
98.
Flagstaff Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Sullivan, 962 F.2d 879, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1992).
99.
Ia at 886.
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If the Interim Guidelines are legally challenged, the Bureau would
likely argue that its Interim Guidelines fall under the "public property"
exception 1°° to section 553 and are thus not subject to the rulemaking
requirement. The public property exception applies to any agency action
where public property is involved. 01 It has covered the Bureau's
adoption of a Reservoir Regulation Manual, 10 2 as well as its withdrawal
of low cost federal power to a city. 03 The exception has also been
applied to the sale of federally owned timber and the operation of a
floodway.' °
Water is, however, a unique resource. While the federal government
owns the diversion and conveyance facilities of the CVP, it does not
"own" the water coursing through them. The United States Supreme Court
has held that beneficial ownership of water rights in irrigation projects
constructed pursuant to the Reclamation Act do not necessarily reside with
the U.S. government. In Ickes v. Fox,'0 5 the Court stated:
Although the government diverted, stored and distributed the water,
the contention of petitioner that thereby ownership of the water or
water-rights became vested in the United States is not well
founded. Appropriation was made not for the use of the
government, but, under the Reclamation Act, for the use of the land
owners; and by the terms of the law and of the contract already
referred to, the water-rights became the property of the land
owners, wholly distinct from the property right of the government
in the irrigation works."°
The Ickes Court declared the government to be "a carrier and distributor"
of water, whose rights to receive revenue for the water were based solely
upon its contracts with Reclamation Act contractors. 0 7 Since then, the

100.

5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1988).

101. Ono v. Harper, 592 F. Supp. 698, 700 (D.Haw. 1983).
102. Oahe Conservancy Sub-Dist. v. Alexander, 493 F. Supp. 1294, 1302-03 (D.S.D. 1980). The
mechanical operation of a dam is a matter related to public property because of the dam's generation of electric
power. Id, at 1303.
103. City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660,673 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1979).
104. Duke City Lumber Co. v. Butz, 382 F. Supp. 362, 373 (D.C. 1974), aff'd in part,539 F.2d 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); see Story v. Marsh 732 F.2d. 1375, 1384 (8th Cir. 1984)

(holding that flowage easements are owned by the government).
105.

300 U.S. 82 (1937).

106.
107.

Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1937).
Id. at 95
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Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed that the United States does not
own the water rights of its projects." 8 As the Court eloquently stated in
Nevada v. United States, "the Government is completely mistaken if it
believes that the water rights confirmed to it . . .were like so many
bushels of wheat, to be bartered, sold, or shifted about as the Government
might see fit."'"
In the authors' view, it is unlikely that promulgation of the Interim
Guidelines would fall under the public property exception to the APA's
notice and rulemaking requirement. Exceptions to the general rule,
including the public property exception, are to be strictly construed." °
While the Bureau would argue that water is no different from electricity,
timber, or other natural resources and is thus public property, water rights
to the CVP water are privately held and should not be considered "public
property." Accordingly, the Interim Guidelines violate the APA.
b. Do CVPIA and the Bureau Guidelines Impair Existing
Contracts?
It is well established that a valid contract right of an irrigation district
against the United States is property protected by the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution."' Moreover, the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment limits the exercise of sovereign power which would
impair obligations under the government contracts."' The government
cannot reserve to itself an unlimited right to escape its contract "without
rendering its promises illusory and the contract void."".3 The
Reclamation Reform Act of 1982 provides that: "Amendments to contracts
which are not required by the provisions of this subchapter shall not be
' 14
made without the consent of the non-Federal party."
The issue arises as to whether the Bureau's clear deviation from
established principles of California water law in the definition of
consumptive use violates the foregoing principles. While an in-depth

108.
Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 126 (1983) (stating that the Government's ownership of
water rights is at most nominal). See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 614 (1945) (holding that a property
right in water is separate and distinct from a property right in conveyance facilities).
109. Nebraska, 325 U.S. at 126.
110. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
111. Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1401 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 59
(1993).
112. Id.
113. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 760 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
114. 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(d) (1988).
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analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article, it appears that the
Bureau has, by administrative fiat, purported to modify the transferable
property interests established under the Bureau water supply contracts.'
3. DWR Policies
As already discussed, state law was recently amended to clarify the
definition of "consumptively used," at least in the context of temporary
transfers. Remarkably, however, DWR has rejected the statutory definition,
choosing instead to follow, in lockstep fashion,1 6 the approach adopted
by the Bureau. DWR states:
Recently adopted Water Code sections 484(b) and 1725 apply to
temporary water transfers. They introduce an element of uncertainty
by defining "consumptively used" as "the amount of water which
has been consumed through use by evapotranspiration, has
percolatedunderground, or has been otherwise removed from use
in the downstream water supply as a result of direct diversion."
The reference to percolation broadens the definition beyond its
traditional meaning, and may encourage transfer proposals that are
not hydrologically sound (i.e., proposals that do not acknowledge
the links between surface and ground water). However, the
Department feels the italicized phrase clarifies that the Legislature
did not intend to authorize transfers of paper water or transfers that
would injure other users. For example, percolation would be
considered part of "consumptive use" only when the water
percolated was irretrievably lost to subsequent beneficial use (the
17
same approach as used by P.L. 102-575).'
While the Department may "feel" that the italicized phrase indicates
that percolation would be considered part of "consumptive use" only when

115. A central issue in the analysis of this topic is whether Bureau water supply contracts confer a
transferable property interest analogous to state-issued water rights. While there are certainly differences between
the property interests conferred' by federal contracts and state water rights, in the authors' view the element of
transferability is implicit in the federal contracts. The authors further believe that the nature and extent of the
transferability interest will be defined by reference to established state water law principles.
116. The Bureau has chosen to work closely with DWR for its definition of "consumptive use." The

Bureau is consulting with DWR in its revision of the term "crop consumptive use" which will appear in its
March 1994 addendum to the Interim Guidelines. Hefler-Scott Interview, supra note 95.
117. WATE1R TRANSFERs, supra note 67, at 14 (emphasis in original).
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the water percolated was irretrievably lost to subsequent beneficial use,
that is not what the statutory language says. Under the clear language of
Water Code section 1725, water is deemed "consumptively used," inter
alia, if it has "percolated underground.""' 8 DWR's willingness to deviate
from long-established water transfer principles and the clear language of
the temporary transfer statute, in favor of the approach used in CVPIA, is
indicative of its institutional bias in favor of restricting the transfer rights
119
of senior water rights holders. For the same reasons discussed above,
DWR's policies raise substantial constitutional issues which are likely to
be resolved only through future litigation.
B. Rights Subject to Transfer
California's system of water rights is often referred to as a "dual
system,"' 20 referring to the two leading doctrinal bases of rights to the
use of surface waters: riparian rights and appropriative rights.
Appropriative rights established prior to December 19, 1914 can be
transferred if there is no adverse impact on other legal water users;' 2 ' in
such cases no administrative approvals are required.2 2 Appropriative
rights established under a permit from the SWRCB can be transferred, but
the SWRCB's approval is normally required for any change in purpose or
place of use or point of diversion.' 23 The issue of the transferability of
riparian rights has recently arisen.
Traditionally, riparian rights were viewed as not being subject to
transfer because the rights run with the land. 24 Since riparians must use
the water on their riparian land, non-riparians who obtain the water right
are similarly restricted.'2 5 Increasingly, however, riparian owners have
sought to transfer their rights.126 For example, the Drought Water Bank

118. CAL. WATER CODE § 1725 (West Supp. 1994).
119. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text.
120. See generallyWilliam R. Attwater & James Markle, Overview of CaliforniaWater Rights and Water
Quality Law, 19 PAC. LJ. 957, 959 (1988) (discussing the dual system).
121. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1725-1745.11 (West Supp. 1994).

122.

Id

123.

Id.

124. See, e.g., In re Waters of Hallet Creek Stream Sys., 44 Cal. 3d 448,749 P.2d 324,243 Cal. Rptr. 448
(1988).
125. Duckworth v. Watsonville Water and Light Co., 150 Cal. 520, 89 P. 338 (1907). If a riparian does
transfer his right to a downstream appropriator, the effect is essentially that the riparian pledges to forego his
diversion and will not object to the downstream appropriation. Id. at 526, 89 P. at 341. This becomes
problematic, however, when there are many riparian diverters downstream since they may divert this water. Id.
126. LEE, supra note 3, at 25.
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purchased riparian water on the theory that water can be made available
elsewhere if the riparian owner is persuaded not to exercise the right.
Similarly, it has been argued that land held under a water rights settlement
contract with the Bureau or DWR, which confirms "base" riparian rights,
should be viewed as having a transferable right on the theory that the
agreement between buyer and seller would call for a "permanent covenant"
prohibiting riparian diversions during certain months of the year, and that
diversions by the buyer for use on non-riparian land would occur under the
authority of State Water Project water rights.' 27 It is unclear at this
juncture whether such arguments will be successful.
Another area of increasing controversy is water transfers that involve
groundwater, either as a direct source of transfer or as a substitute for
transferred surface supplies. Legal analysis of such transfers is often
complicated by the difficulty, from a technical standpoint, of determining
the nature and extent of the hydrologic connection between groundwater
and surface watercourses. While groundwater is in many instances
naturally interconnected to surface water, the degree of hydrologic
continuity varies greatly. In some cases groundwater withdrawal will
significantly decrease surface flows within days, while in others the effect
on surface waters may take years to appear, if it does so at all. 28
Ascertaining the effect that a groundwater withdrawal will have on basin
waters is an extremely imprecise and complex process. To complicate this
issue further, the SWRCB does not have the jurisdiction to regulate the
extraction of percolating groundwater.'2 9 As a result, the principal
responsibility for analyzing the water supply and the environmental
impacts of transfers involving groundwater typically rests with the Bureau
and DWR, as operators of required conveyancing facilities.
In recent years, the California Legislature has sought to ameliorate the
adverse impacts of transfers involving groundwater. For instance, Water
Code section 1220 prohibits direct exports of groundwater from the
Sacramento and Delta-Central Sierra Basins unless the pumping complies
with a voter approved groundwater management plan. 3 In addition,

127. Memorandum from Water Transfer Associates to the Department of Water Resources (Aug. 31, 1993)
(on file with the authors). The memorandum describes the proposed sale of riparian rights by Broomieside Ranch

in Sutter County. l The proposed sale addressed the need for an agreement between buyer and seller
prohibiting riparian diversions. Id.
128. WATER TRANSFERS, supra note 67, at 16.
129. The SWRCB has jurisdiction over subterranean streams flowing through known and definite channels.
CAL. WATER CODE § 1200 (West 1971).
130. CAL. WATER CODE § 1220 (West Supp. 1994).
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local water agencies are now authorized to adopt groundwater management
plans, which could have significant impacts on direct groundwater
export."' Finally, Water Code section 1745.10, discussed above,
regulates indirect transfers of groundwater, which occur when an irrigator
substitutes groundwater for surface water and then transfers the rights to
the surface water. 3 2 This section requires that any such transfer be
consistent with an adopted groundwater management plan.133 However,
if no plan has been adopted, the transfer must be approved by the water
supplier from whose area the water is transferred, based on a determination
that the transfer "will not create or contribute to, conditions of long-term
overdraft in the affected groundwater basin.""
It is ironic that, with the exception of the Water Bank, 35 it is
becoming increasingly difficult to transfer groundwater even though
groundwater pumping for overlying basin use is essentially unregulated in
California. In the authors' view, legislative standards are required to
clarify, first, who has the burden of proving that a transfer involving
groundwater will result in injury, and, second, how "injury" is defined in
the groundwater context, where the effects of transfers on an aquifer may
not immediately manifest themselves.
C. The Future Role of the Drought Water Bank
In the midst of the drought in 1991, DWR announced that the State
Water Project would be unable to make any deliveries to agricultural
contractors and only 10% of its normal deliveries to municipal and
industrial contractors.136 The state's reservoirs were at 54% of their
normal levels137 and no end to the drought was in sight. These
circumstances prompted Governor Wilson to issue an executive order
which directed DWR to establish the Drought Water Bank to facilitate the
short term transfer of water. 38 Related legislation granted water suppliers

131. Id. §§ 10750-10753 (West Supp. 1994).
132. Id. § 1745.10 (West Supp. 1994).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Most Water Bank groundwater substitution contracts have permitted the transfer of one acre foot of
unused surface diversion for each acre foot pumped from the ground. WATER TRANSFERs, supra note 67, at 15.
136. RICHARD W. WAHL, WATER MARKETING IN CALIFORNIA: PAST EXPERIENCE, FUTU
PROSPECTS
10 (Reason Found. Pol'y Study No. 162, 1993).
137. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE 1991 DROUGHT WATER BANK
1 (1991) [hereinafter DWR].
138. Executive Order 91-W-3.
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that Bank contracts
the right to contract with the Bank and emphasized
139
rights.
water
of
loss
the
in
result
not
would
DWR rapidly designed the program and drafted the Water Bank
contracts. In 1991, DWR set a standard purchase price of $125 per acrefoot (af), which it believed would be enough to induce vast agricultural
participation.140 The selling price was set at $175/af; transportation costs
through the Delta and administrative costs accounted for the $50
differential.' Water purchasers had to enter into separate conveyance
contracts, often with DWR or the Bureau, to transport the water from the
Delta to its ultimate place of use. 4 2 This additional transport fee made
the water very expensive to urban purchasers. 3 Within months of its
creation, the Water Bank entered into 351 purchase contracts which
resulted in the procurement of 820,805 af of water." Thirteen buyers
purchased about 560,000 af of this water145in 1991. The remaining 266,000
af ended up as SWP carryover storage.
Most of the purchasers were large urban entities. DWR required
purchasers to have critical water needs, meaning that they had seventy-five
percent or less water than they would have had in a normal water
year."4 Because of this requirement and the relatively high purchase
price, large municipal suppliers were practically the only entities that could
buy the water. As a result, the water purchasers were mostly urban
suppliers located south of the Delta. 47 Of the total amount of water
purchased, forty-seven percent went to meet immediate urban demands,
forty percent went into storage, and thirteen percent was immediately used
by the agricultural sector.' 48

139. WAHL, supra note 137, at 9; see CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.05 (West Supp. 1994) (specifying water
eligibility for transfer).

140. DWR, supra note 136, at 7. This purchase price resulted in a payment of $450 per acre for land that
had been planted with water intensive crops such as alfalfa, pasture, and rice, and a payment of $250 and below
per acre for low water intensive crops such as wheat and barley. Id.
141. Forty-five dollars represents the transportation costs; $5 the administrative costs. John B. Loomis, The
1991 State of CaliforniaWater Bank: Water Marketing Takes a Quantum Leap, 3 RIvERS 129, 130 (1992).
142. DWR, supra note 137, at 9.
143. For instance, the ultimate cost to San Francisco was $400/af. lId

144.

lId at 2. This is approximately the amount of water that would be supplied by a $3 billion dam.

Loomis, supra note 141, at 130.
145. WAHL, supra note 136, at 16; Loomis, supra note 141, at 12. The SWP purchased the water, then
passed the costs along to its contracting water districts. WAHL, supra note 136, at 17.
146. WAHL, supra note 136, at 18.
147. Metropolitan Water District purchased the largest amount of water (215,000 at), while the next two
largest purchasers were San Francisco (50,000 at) and Kern County Water Agency (53,000 at). Loomis, supra
note 141, at 131.
148. WAHL, supra note 136, at 12.
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Most of the water sellers were agricultural interests located north of
and in the Delta. 49 Fifty percent of the water sold to the Bank was made
available by farmers who temporarily took their lands out of production.
In all, 166,000 acres of farm land was fallowed or dry farmed. 50 Most
of this land had supported corn and wheat in previous years.' The
effect on corn production was particularly severe. 5 2 The second largest
source of water (thirty-two percent) came from water districts and farmers
who substituted ground water pumping for their surface water
diversions."' Finally, eighteen percent of the water sold to the Water
Bank came from reservoir storage.'5"
When all was said and done, the Water Bank provided more than
enough water in the driest year of the drought. Heavy rainfall in March
1991, coupled with the high purchase price and conveyance costs, greatly
diminished the demand for the water. Nonetheless, DWR' managed to
implement a program to meet critical needs and sell most of the water in
1991.
The 1992 Water Bank was conducted on a much smaller scale than
1991's Bank. Because of the large amount of carryover storage, DWR set
the purchase price at only $50/af. This amount was too low to induce
farmers to forego surface irrigation, and consequently all of the purchased
water came from storage and ground water substitution projects. 155 The
water was sold at $72/af, and was bought primarily by agricultural
entities.156 In the end, the Water Bank purchased 193,193 af of water and
was able to sell all of it in 1992.157
Despite its hasty creation and economic inefficiencies, the Water Bank
helped California through a major crisis. DWR, in its role as a broker,
clearinghouse, and transporter, provided both sellers and purchasers with
transfer opportunities that they might not otherwise have had. The Water
Bank will continue to play a vital role in mitigating the adverse

149. DWR, supra note 137, at 16.
150. Id Twenty percent of the agricultural land in Sacramento County and 10% in San Joaquin County
was fallowed or dry fanned. WAIH, supra note 136, at 30.
151. DWR, supra note 137, at 16.
152. Corn production in the Delta region dropped 66% due to land fallowing. Id
153. WAHi, supra note 137, at 11. Much of the increased ground water pumping occurred in the Yuba

and Feather River watersheds. Id.
154. Id
155. Id. at 14.
156. Sixty percent of the water went to agricultural uses, 25% to urban uses, and 15% for fish and wildlife
uses. Id
157.
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consequences of droughts.15 However, as noted above, DWR's authority
to determine the amount of water available for transfer should be curtailed,
given the agency's principal role of project operator.15 9
D. The Debate Over User-InitiatedTransfers
Potential water purchasers claim that water transfers would increase if
individual water users, within water districts, were permitted to sell their
water outside of the districts.' 60 There have been several recent
legislative attempts aimed at permitting these "user initiated transfers."
With the possible exception of CVPIA,161 these legislative proposals
have thus far been rejected.' 62
Water districts and agricultural purveyors are strongly opposed to such
legislation. If a large number of members sell their water outside of a
district, fewer members are left to pay the district's fixed capital costs.
This defection increases the real costs for those members who decide not
to sell their water. Since districts act as trustees for all of their members,
they are obligated to keep costs as low as possible. User initiated transfers
threaten their ability to uphold this obligation. 63 Moreover, individual
members who do not transfer their water argue that, since they are paying
for the facilities, they are entitled to any of the water that their fellow
members decide to sell.' 64
Since most district charters and bylaws are unclear as to whether user
initiated transfers are permissible, 65 there have been several recent

158. For a discussion of potential efficiency improvements see WAHl., supra note 136, at 15-18. For a
review of potential equity improvements, see WATER BANK EIR, supra note 10, at 185-86.
159. See supra notes 136-158 and accompanying text.
160. In some cases, individual users must also seek approval of their parent districts to purchase water.
For instance, the DWR-MWD contract requires the approval of both of these parties before a member agency
of the MWD may purchase water from a source outside of its service area. George Basye & David R.E.
Aladjem, Water-User Transfer Legislation: Is It Needed?, 4 CAL. WATER RPI. 19, 22 (1993).
161. While CVPIA does not squarely address the issue of user-initiated transfers, implicit in the
requirements relating to approvals of transfers by "contracting districts" is the notion that water may be
transferred by district water users. Pub. Law No. 102-575, § 3405(2). Where more than twenty percent of the
water under contract to a district is proposed for transfer, approval by the district is required. Id.
162. Basye & Aladjem, supra note 160, at 20 (discussing the failure to pass legislation regarding the
transfer of agricultural water).
163. Comm=ran ON WESTERN WATER MANAGEMENT, WATER SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY BoARD,
COMMISSION ON ENGIEEIG AND TECHNOLOGY SySTMs, NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, WATER TRANsFERS

INTHE WEST 226 (1992) [hereinafter WATER TRANSFERS INTHE WEST].
164. Brian Gray et al., Transferof FederalReclamation Water:A Case Study of California'sSan Joaquin
Valley, 21 ENVTL. L. 911, 973 (1991).
165. Il at 974.
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legislative attempts to allow such transfers. Assembly Bill 2090 sought to
give individual water users pro rata rights to district water. 66 Had this
legislation been enacted, water districts would have lost the ability to
effectively manage their water since water users would have been
permitted to transfer water without the approval of the district or its other
members. 167 A more modest proposal, Assembly Bill 2020, would have
given water purveyors veto power over water sales initiated by their
individual water users. 68 If given this veto power, the Districts' 6refusals
9
would have been subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard.1
Legislation in this area appears unnecessary since there is little
evidence that the perceived legal restrictions have diminished the supply
of water available for transfer. Water Code section 1745.05 strikes an
appropriate balance by permitting individual water users to contract with
their districts for the use of less water through conservation or fallowing
measures. 170 In this manner, the water user gets consideration from the
district while the district has the ability to market the water and effectively
manage its water supplies.
E. Mitigating Third Party Impacts
Widespread water marketing has the potential to cripple agricultural
communities. The transfer of significant amounts of water from rural
communities, particularly over long periods of time, may lead to extensive
land fallowing and abandonment. The effects of this land and crop
abandonment ripple through local agricultural economies, adversely
affecting both farm workers and farm related industries. 17' Community
tax bases also shrink as a result of the loss of revenue, 7 1 just at the time
local government services are most needed.
The actual severity of these third party effects is in dispute. Water
transfer proponents cite the 1991 Drought Water Bank as evidence that
areas of origin will not be greatly impacted by water marketing and that
water marketing will have a very positive effect on the California

166.

Basye & Aladjem, supra note 160, at 20.

167.
168.

Id.
L

169.
L at 21.
170. CAT. WATER CODE § 1745.05 (West Supp. 1994).
171. These industries include seed and fertilizer sales, grocery stores, restaurants and retailers, banks and
lending institutions, medical services, and trucking. NEA, supra note 26, at 2.
172. WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST, supra note 163, at 227.
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economy. Agricultural communities argue that such analyses overlook the
effect that transfers have at the local level, and that long term transfers
could have much more devastating impacts than observed to date.
1. Socio-Economic Impacts of Water Transfers
Urban areas and agricultural water sellers were clearly the big winners
of the 1991 Bank. A recent study, conducted by the Rand Corporation,
concluded that urban areas benefitted by $59 million while the agricultural
sellers benefitted by $45 million.173 Farmers who sold their water
because of irrigation withdrawal earned an average revenue of $35/af while
those who substituted groundwater for their surface supplies earned an
average of $17/af. 74 This large influx of revenue to agricultural sellers
helped mitigate the impacts on their communities. For instance, farm
investment rose by $5.7 million due to the sudden revenue influx.17 5 This
investment at least partially softened the blow to agricultural related
industries.
The operation of the Water Bank caused crop sales to shrink by about
three percent in eleven agricultural counties. 176 Yolo, San Joaquin, Butte,
and Yuba Counties were hit the hardest. 177 Rice, sugar beets, and alfalfa
were affected the most.178 Overall, crop losses caused agricultural
business to drop by two to three percent in the affected counties and
79
resulted in a loss of approximately $13 million from unemployment.1
Still, this unemployment was not severe.' As expected, part time labor
was hit the hardest.1"'
The Rand Report concluded that there were "no overall adverse
economic impacts on county economies" as a result of the Water
Bank. 2 The two to three percent drop in agricultural business was a

173.

WATER BANK PROGRAM EIRMsupra note 10, at 181.

174. RAND CORPORATION, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER REsOURCEs, CALnFORNIA'S
DROUGHT WATER BANK 37 (1993) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].

1991

175.
176.
177.

1a. at 39.
d at 40.
IdL at 34.
178. RAND REPORT, supra note 174, at 22.
179. Id. at 54; WAHL, supra note 136, at 31.
180. The Rand Report estimates that only 162 jobs were lost as a result of the Bank. WATER BANK EIR,
supra note 10, at 181 (summarizing the Rand Report).
181. RAND REPORT, supra note 174, at 39.
182. 1&. at 54.
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small one compared to the agricultural downturn of the 1980's. 83 When
juxtaposed with the enormous benefits that the Bank created,' 84 it is
relatively easy to dismiss these third party impacts on areas of origin as
minor.
It is much less easy, however, to dismiss these impacts when they are
viewed at a more local and personal level. Northwest Associates conducted
a study of the 1991 decline in San Joaquin Valley water usage attributable
to the drought (800,000 af). This study employed total figures instead of
percentages. It concluded that 237,000 acres of land were idled, 124,000
acres suffered decreased yield, and 13,000 acres were abandoned as a
result of decreased water usage.185 Farm revenues fell $282 million while
total revenues (farm and farm related) dropped $545 million.'86 As a
result, total employment in the San Joaquin Valley fell by 9,000.87
Additionally, the 1991 Water Bank might not be an accurate portrayal
of the effect of short term transfers. March rains softened the Bank's blow
to agricultural communities by providing needed irrigation. In some
instances, farmers received a full share of crops in the absence of surface
irrigation.' Were it not for this late rainfall, the effects on areas of
origin would have been more severe.
Long term transfers of water from areas such as the San Joaquin
Valley could have more profound and lasting effects. The long term
withdrawal of water from agricultural communities will cause the
permanent abandonment of large tracts of land. Since land value is
decreased by approximately fifty percent when not irrigated, 8 9 this
abandonment will severely decrease the tax base and impact community
services. A long series of short term transfers (such as repeated
involvement with the Water Bank) could similarly impact agricultural
9
regions since it is difficult to stop and then restart farm production.' 0

183. This decline is about one sixth of that experienced at the low point of the 1980's. WA L, supra note
136, at 31.
184. The RAND Report estimated that net benefits to the state to be $91 million. WATER BANK EIR, supra
note 10, at 181.
185. NEA, supra note 26, at 17.

186. Id
187. 1d. The enormous discrepancy in unemployment estimates between the RAND Report and the NEA
Study illustrates the difficulty inherent in determining the real area of origin effects of water transfers. It is
almost impossible to separate "background noise," such as U.S. Department of Agriculture programs and natural

crop variation, from the transfers themselves. See WATER BANK EIR, supra note 10, at 183 (explaining
variables).
188. RAND REPORT, supra note 174, at 181.
189. NEA, supra note 26, at 18.
190. Id at 11.
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The Water Bank EIR recognized these problems and recommended that
there be a consecutive three year limitation on Water Bank participation
by any one region.' 9'
These areas of origin concerns should not bar water marketing; rather,
buyers and sellers should consider these impacts and seek to reduce them.
The twenty percent land fallowing restriction of Water Code section
1745.05 is an example of how water transfers can be managed so as to
mitigate damage to areas of origin. Another proposal is to tax water
transfers and transfer the revenue to community governments. The 1991
Water Bank contracted with Yolo and Butte Counties, for instance, and
transferred two percent of its receipts from sellers in those counties to the
counties to offset any community impacts. 92 While measures such as
these are not a complete panacea to adverse third party impacts, they do
at least they soften the blow to areas of origin without unduly restricting
water transfers.
2. Impacts on the Environment
Water marketing has the potential to both enhance and harm
environmental resources. Transfers threaten to deplete groundwater basins,
increase the amount of water consumptively used, and disrupt fisheries.
However, they also have the potential to increase water use efficiency and
augment instream flows.
Extensive water marketing could severely deplete groundwater basins.
Much of the water sold to the 1991 Water Bank, for instance, was
available because of massive groundwater substitution that took place in
the Feather and Yuba River basins. 9 Such groundwater depletion can
lead to subsidence, poor water quality, and low water levels.'94 This
problem could be particularly severe in the Central Valley, since Central
Valley urban areas already obtain much of their water from groundwater
supplies. 95 The recent enactment of Water Code section 1745.10 should
minimize groundwater overdraft, however. This provision permits
groundwater substitution only if it is consistent with an approved
groundwater management plan or if the water supplier determines that the

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

WATER BANK EIR, supra note 10, at 184.
Id. at 11-12.
WAHL, supra note 136, at 11.
WATER BANK EIR, supra note 10, at 116.
NEA, supra note 26, at 13.
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transfer will not cause long term overdraft problems.'96 Future Water
ensure that transferors act in accordance with this
Banks will
provision. 197
There is also a perceived danger that transfers will increase the
consumptive use of water and, thus, adversely affect instream flows. Water
Code section 1725 partially eliminates this threat by explicitly limiting
transfers to the amount consumptively used. The State Board must also
find that a proposed change in use will not unreasonably affect fish and
wildlife.198
Of greater concern is the effect that large scale transfers could have on
the ecology of the Delta. During the 1991 Water Bank, officials were
concerned that extensive water transportation through the Delta could harm
endangered and threatened species such as winter run chinook salmon and
striped bass. 199 The DFG recommended timing restrictions to cool water
temperatures for the benefit of migrating salmon." ° As a result, the
DWR released water from the San Luis Reservoir (located south of the
Delta) early in the season, and was thus able to delay delivery through the
Delta until September and October to protect the salmon and bass. 20 '
Additionally, the DWR kept the Shasta Reservoir at maximum storage
levels to ensure proper water quality for the winter run salmon.2°2 With
these measures, the state was able to facilitate water transfers while also
accommodating environmental concerns.
In light of the impending Delta water quality standards and endangered
species restrictions, it is probably more accurate to view decreased water
marketing as a third party impact of environmental protection. Already,
Delta transport restrictions are creating difficult obstacles to water
transfers. Long term transfers are temporarily suspended until study of
their ecological consequences is completed. 0 3 Unfortunately, most
transferred water must pass through the Delta via SWP facilities. Since
transfers have the lowest priority (behind SWP and CVP contractors) for
use of these facilities, transport restrictions hit long term transfers the

196. CAL. WATER CODE § 1745.10 (West Supp. 1994); CVPIA, Pub. L. No. 102-575, §§ 3405(J), 106
Stat. 4600,4706 (1992) (stating that the Secretary must determine that the transfer will not have significant long
term adverse impacts on groundwater conditions ifi transferor's service area).
197. WATER BANK EIR, supra note 10, at 7-8.
198. CAL. WATER CODE § 1725 (West Supp. 1994).
199. WATER BANK EIR, supra note 10, at 154.
l
200.
201. DWR, supra note 137, at 10.
202. 1&.
203. Hill, supra note 16, at 322.
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hardest.3' Until complex Delta ecological questions are resolved, both
short and long term transfers will be impeded or made impossible.
The "final solution" to the Delta quandary must permit some type of
long term water marketing to occur. Revenue generated from water sales
may be used by agricultural purveyors and farmers to fund capital
improvements that will in turn lead to more efficient water use. 0 5 More
efficient water use will decrease water demand and, consequently, obviate
the need for new and potentially ecologically damaging projects. Water
transfers also have the potential to increase instream flows and provide
habitat for waterfowl. 206
F. Antitrust Concerns
The growth of water marketing has led several antitrust experts to
consider whether antitrust liability may attach in some cases to water
transfers. While an exhaustive analysis of this issue is well beyond the
scope of this Article, this brief discussion seeks to identify the major
issues.
The Sherman Act prohibits agreements and predatory conduct that
result in restraints on competition. 0 7 Commentators have cited two
principal reasons why water marketing transactions should not run afoul
of the antitrust laws. They are (1) state action immunity, and (2) the
Noerr-Penningtonexception.
First, it has been argued that most water transfers should fall under the
state action immunity exception to the Sherman Act.20 8 This exception
applies when a state authorizes restraints on competition.20 A recent
federal appellate decision, Kern-Tulare Water District v. City of
Bakersfield,210 held that a municipality's refusal to transfer surplus water
was immune from antitrust liability because competition was displaced by
204. RICHARD Howrrr Er AL., CALIFORNIA DEPARTmENT OF WATER REsouRcEs, A RETROSPECTIVE ON
CALFORNA'S 1991 EMERGENCY DRouGrr WATER BANK 6 (1992).
205. WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEsT, supra note 163, at 230.
206. Both the 1991 and 1992 Water Banks provided supplemental water for wildlife refuges. WATER BANK
EIR, supra note 10, at 9. For a discussion of how water marketing can augment instream flows, see Paul R.
Williams & Stephen J. McHugh, Water Marketing andInstream Flows: The Next Step in ProtectingCalifornia's
Instream Values, 9 STAN. ENVTL LJ. 132 (1990).
207. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. II 1990).
208. Ronald S. Katz & Mary B. Neumayr, Water Marketing/TransfersAnd The Antitrust Laws, 4 CAL.
WATER L. & POL'Y RpR. 4 (1993).
209. lid at 4. The immunity has been extended to apply to the conduct of municipalities,. local
governmental agencies, and in some instances, private actors. Id.
210. 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988).
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regulation in the area of municipal control over water rights.2 ' If it is
foreseeable that the restriction at issue is a result of the grant of regulatory
authority to the entity, the decision is protected by the state immunity
doctrine. 212 The holding of Kern-Tulare Water District was limited to
municipal control over water transfers and did not involve a combination
of municipalities. 213 As such, it is unclear whether a reviewing court
would permit a water district, for instance, or a combination of
municipalities, to veto a proposed transfer.214
Second, commentators argue that the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine should
immunize private efforts to influence water district transfer decisions from
antitrust liability. 215 This doctrine generally permits lobbying efforts that
may harm competitors so long as the lobbying proponents have an
expectation that their lobbying will result in lawful government action.216
Private attempts at influencing water district transfers, either through
or exertion of legal pressure, should thus
election of board representatives
217
be protected by this doctrine.
The authors are not as sanguine as other commentators concerning the
potential for antitrust issues arising from the development of water
markets. In the authors' view, the method by which, for example, the
purchase price of water is established by the Drought Water Bank, merits
continued scrutiny to ensure compliance with state and federal antitrust
protections.
V. CONCLUSION

Water transfers in California came of age during the 1987-92 drought.
The Drought Water Bank was remarkably successful in facilitating the
movement of large quantities of water from agricultural to urban sectors.

211.

Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. Bakersfield, 828 F.2d 514, 519 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.

1015 (1988). The Court found that the municipality's decision did not result in unreasonable use. Id. at 521.
212.

Id. at 519; Katz & Neumayr, supra note 208, at 5.

213.

Id. at 517. Additionally, there was a clause in the municipality - water district contract that granted

the city the right to veto a proposed transfer. IL at 516. Whether a court would allow a similar restriction in the
absence of such a contract is an open question.
214. Additionally, since most parties to transfers are public entities, the public entity exception to the
active state supervision requirement applies. Grason Elec. Co. v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 770 F.2d 833, 838

(9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,474 U.S. 1103 (1986) (stating that this exception applies to municipalities). Because
of active regulation, it would also appear that private parties to transfers would not fall under state action
immunity, since the state would be actively supervising the transfer.
215. Katz & Neumayr, supra note 208, at 6.
216. 1L
217. Id.
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But at what price? The institutionalization of DWR and the Bureau in the
role of chief arbiter of future transfer policy is troubling, given those
agencies' dual roles. Unless objective standards can be developed by
unbiased decision-makers, it is questionable whether water marketing will
achieve its full potential.
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